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Introduction
 “We must break free of the EU and take 
back control of our borders.” This adamant 
declaration by Nigel Farage succeeded as an 
inflammatory and provocative advertisement 
for the Leave campaign (Stone). On June 
23, 2016, with 17 million votes and a 51.9% 
majority, the UK voted to leave the EU, which 
the UK had belonged to since 1973 (“EU 
Referendum Results”). Thus began an era of 
significant economic, political, and legislative 
uncertainty in the UK.
 Following the vote, Lord Ashcroft, a UK 
businessman and political figure, conducted 
a survey exploring the motivations of those 
who voted to leave; 49% voted to leave the EU 
because they believed the UK should have more 
control over its own affairs and 33% voted solely 
to have more control over immigration and the 
border (Roff). Thus, much of the incentive to 
vote for the Leave campaign coincided with an 
intense fear of outsiders. With independence 
from the EU, the UK will no longer be required 
to abide by the EU’s freedom of movement 
directive. Having triggered Article 50 and 
begun the “divorce” process, the UK must now 
form its own policies regarding the inflows 
and outflows of people across its border. The 
implications of these policies will be felt by 
the entire country as the restriction of EU 
immigrants will, at the very least, dramatically 
change the make-up of the labor force in key 
industries within the UK economy.
 The goal of this article is to estimate the 
ultimate economic effects of the UK’s new 
immigration reform. In order to explore the 
impact, likely demographic changes to the 
labor force that will occur within each major 
industrial sector as a result of this policy are 
examined. From there, sectors are identified 
that will likely suffer the hardest blow from 
immigration reform because they most depend 
on EU immigrants who fall in the categories 
that the UK is trying to deter from entering the 
country. 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
UK IMMIGRATION REFORM 
FOLLOWING BREXIT
Katherine Wu
Domestic sentiment toward outsiders in the UK has become fueled 
with negativity and wariness. A heated Leave campaign succeeded in 
convincing the public that EU citizens were destroying the economy. 
This article studies the true economic role of EU citizens in the 
UK prior to dissecting the proposed immigration policy following 
Brexit to predict the effect of reduced EU immigration to different 
sectors of the UK economy.
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 To fully comprehend the economic impact 
of a new immigration policy, the previous state 
of the UK economy must first be understood. 
Therefore, after an analysis of the state of EU 
immigrants and the economy prior to Brexit, 
potential policy options are examined, followed 
by a breakdown of how these policy changes 
will alter the previous immigrant economic 
environment.
The UK Immigration Debate:  
Its Origins and Importance
 Immigration into the UK has substantially 
increased over the past couple of decades. With 
a desirable labor market and standard of life, 
the UK is a major recipient of immigrants 
looking for residence and work. Figure 1 
shows that until 1998, net migration (net 
immigration minus net emigration) remained 
below 100,000 annually (ONSb). Then, net 
migration increased and remained at a higher 
level, reaching 313,000 in 2014. It is evident 
that the driving factor for this increased net 
migration is the rapidly growing immigration, 
swelling from around 300,000 in 1970 to 
632,000 in 2014 (ONSb).
 With this rapidly increasing immigration, 
the demographics in the UK have shifted. 
The greater number of foreign-born people 
living in the UK reflects a more globalized 
country. However, negative sentiments toward 
“outsiders” and the idea that immigrants 
are “stealing” public services and jobs have 
become the overarching ideologies throughout 
many regions of the UK not accustomed to 
these different populations. According to the 
British Social Attitudes survey in 2013, when 
UK citizens were asked their preference for 
immigration levels in Britain, an overwhelming 
77% chose that immigration should either be 
“reduced a lot” or “reduced a little,” with more 
than 56% choosing “reduced a lot” (Blinder). 
Figure 1
Net Migration to the UK, 1970–2014
Source: ONSb.
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 Perhaps most importantly, public opinion 
regarding the economic impacts of immigrants 
is overall negative. Many UK citizens hold the 
belief that people coming into the UK are 
more expensive than they are contributive. 
According to the British Social Attitudes survey 
in 2013, when asked about migrants coming to 
work, UK citizens thought that their costs to 
the overall economy substantially outweighed 
their benefits (Blinder). But is this perception 
of non-contributive immigrants borne out by 
the economic evidence?
Economic Influence of EU Nationals 
Immigrating to the UK Before Brexit
 EU workers did not dominate the pre-
Brexit UK labor market. According to the 
Annual Population Survey (APS) conducted 
by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
EU workers comprised only about 7.2% of the 
UK labor force in 2016 (ONSa). Furthermore, 
additional data from the ONS document 
that 45% of incoming EU nationals to the 
UK already had a definite job while another 
24% were coming to look for work (Vargas-
Silva). Additionally, a much higher share of 
EU migrants was considered overqualified for 
their occupations than native workers, with 
40% of EU81 nationals deemed overqualified 
 1 EU2: Bulgaria and Romania.
  EU8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
  EU10: EU8, Cyprus, and Malta.
  EU14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Sweden.
  All EU countries: EU2, E10, E14, and Croatia.
  EEA countries: all EU countries, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway.
compared to 15% of UK natives (ONSa). Thus, 
data suggest that a majority of immigrating EU 
nationals came to the UK to contribute to the 
economy.
 But did these immigrants substantially 
contribute to the UK economy or did they 
take more from public services provided than 
they contributed? Accounting for government 
costs for immigrants, it becomes clear that 
immigrants pre-Brexit provided more fiscal 
benefits to the UK economy than government 
costs. Data from the annual Labour Force 
Survey and further data from the ONS enable 
modeling government expenditures, revenues, 
and fiscal costs as well as the contributions 
of individuals to government budgets. In 
addition, the overall population can be broken 
down into four sub-groups to calculate the 
contributions of each: UK-born citizens, EU10 
immigrants, other European Economic Area 
(EEA) immigrants, and non-EEA immigrants. 
Table 1 presents net fiscal contributions and 
implicit contributions through education 
over the years 2001 to 2011 by citizen type, 
as modeled by Dustmann and Frattini. Pre-
Brexit, UK-born citizens imposed a large 
economic burden on public sector budgets, 
costing more in government expenditures 
than they contributed in taxes and fees, 
whereas immigrants were, on average, net 
contributors fiscally. In particular, immigrants 
from the EEA countries contributed the most 
of the three immigrant populations. Due 
to the disproportionate sizes of the various 
populations, the raw fiscal contribution 
figures could be misleading. To standardize, 
Table 1 also shows the ratio of expenditures to 
contributions. UK-born citizens have the lowest 
ratio of 0.895. Because this value is below 1, 
Table 1
Net Fiscal Contributions to UK Government Based on Country of Origin
UK Born EU10 Other EEA Non-EEA
Overall fiscal contribution (£ billions) −616.53 4.96 15.26 5.21
Ratio (revenues/expenditures) 0.90 1.12 1.64 1.03
Education contribution (£ billions) — 4.31 2.50 11.19
Source: Dustmann and Frattini.
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their expenses outweighed their contributions. 
On the other hand, EEA countries have the 
highest ratio at 1.640. Since the EEA ratio is 
well above 1, their contributions substantially 
outweighed the costs they imposed on the 
UK economy. Simply put, UK-born citizens 
were a drain on public sector budgets, while 
immigrant populations were contributive.
 The implicit costs and benefits that 
immigrants imposed on the UK pre-Brexit 
are now addressed. The previous two metrics 
measure the explicit revenues and costs of 
public services: monetary receipts and costs 
that can be directly calculated by examining 
the fiscal numbers. Implicit costs or benefits 
consist of opportunity losses or gains rather 
than monetary ones. These are often overlooked 
when considering the balance of economic 
contributions because they are not as tangible 
or obvious as actual money exchanges. A 
thriving economy has not only economically 
contributive citizens but also intellectually 
beneficial citizens. Without brainpower, skill, 
and knowledge, an economy cannot grow. 
Because the immigrants to the UK, on average, 
were more educated than UK-born citizens, 
immigrants provided an even greater fiscal 
contribution. Immigrants were bringing 
a valuable commodity with them into the 
country that the UK did not have to pay for, an 
opportunity gain for the economy. The implicit 
educational savings alone between 2001 and 
2011 total nearly £18 billion (Dustmann and 
Frattini).
 Another way to evaluate the economic 
impact of immigrants is to examine the 
impact of immigrants on GDP per capita. If 
GDP per capita of immigrants is lower, on 
average, than that of the UK population, then 
they may be considered a detriment to the 
economy, potentially dragging the average 
down. If immigrants came to the UK as a non-
Figure 2
GDP Per Capita vs. Net Migration
Sources: FREDa; FREDb; FREDc. 
61
contributory force, then GDP per capita would 
plummet faster as the population increases 
with more immigrants and a stagnant GDP to 
divide among them. Looking at data from 1971 
to 2014 and visualizing GDP per capita in the 
UK and net migration in the UK as functions 
of time, however, reveal a strong positive 
correlation between net migration and GDP 
per capita (Figure 2). This does not prove that 
increasing net migration causes this growing 
GDP per capita, but it provides evidence that 
the economy likely did not suffer due to the 
influx of immigrants. There is a small decline 
in GDP per capita in the UK between the years 
of 2007 and 2009; although, when the GDP per 
capita growth in the UK is compared with those 
of Germany and France, all these countries 
experience this dip during these years—the 
global effect of the Financial Crisis of 2008 
(FREDa; FREDb; FREDc).
 From these calculations, it can be 
concluded that in recent years, immigrants 
have contributed significantly more than they 
have received in benefits. And because these 
immigrants pay in more than their share of 
public expenditures, they are in turn reducing 
the fiscal burden of public services for UK-born 
citizens. In the wake of Brexit and impending 
immigration reforms, restricting immigrants 
from entering could result in a strong negative 
impact on public budgets and more broadly on 
the overall growth of the UK economy, given 
their relatively high education. 
Core Concepts of UK Immigration 
Reform Regarding EU Nationals
 In order to forecast the economic impacts 
of these reforms, it is necessary to understand 
some core concepts of the UK immigration 
proposals. The UK is in the midst of reconciling 
a final immigration policy, so uncertainty 
remains. However, by analyzing a document 
leaked from the UK government, the effects 
of the most influential reform concepts on 
labor force and economic productivity can be 
predicted.
 To formulate post-Brexit immigration 
policy, the UK government turned to the 
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC), an 
independent, non-statutory public body. 
On July 27, 2017, MAC was commissioned 
to advise the government on the impacts of 
immigration and shortages within industries 
(“Commissioning…”). After two months of 
research input from MAC, the government was 
ready to develop an initial plan.
 On September 5, 2017, a leaked document 
labeled “official sensitive” from the Home 
Office was released online. The document, 
titled “Border, Immigration, and Citizenship 
System,” details a plan with three separate 
phases to integrate the new immigration policy 
with the reality of pre-existing EU nationals 
settled in the UK (Partington et al.). 
 The first phase seeks to ensure that the EU 
migration can be regulated through the UK’s 
legal framework. This involves a grace period of 
up to two years before a specific date by which 
EU citizens residing in the UK must apply 
for settled status, or a temporary residency 
permit. It proposes reform legislation to turn 
off the EU’s freedom of movement directive 
and move EU citizens under the rules and 
regulations that non-EU citizens are already 
required to follow in the UK’s pre-existing 
Immigration Bill of 1971. This first phase of 
the plan, therefore, would put EU citizens and 
other non-UK citizens under the same legal 
framework regarding immigration. 
 The second phase would occur after the 
official departure of the UK from the EU and 
would introduce an Implementation Period, 
which the document claims “provides a smooth 
and orderly exit for employers and individuals” 
through an initial unrestricted phase where 
EU immigrants can work, study, and reside 
without previous permission from the Home 
Office, followed by several periods of increased 
restrictions and requirements.
 The final phase begins a period in which 
the UK imposes their own rules to control the 
volume and type of migration from the EU, 
both temporary and permanent, in the national 
interest. The exact rules are currently still 
being debated, but the UK intends to continue 
utilizing MAC’s research to consider social and 
economic impacts of immigration reform as 
the time to make these decisions draws nearer.
 Two proposed changes to immigration 
rules stand out in this Home Office document. 
The first involves the methodology to decrease 
the numbers of lower-skilled workers entering 
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the country. The plan limits the length of 
temporary work permits to a maximum of 
two years for EU nationals seeking low-skilled 
occupations in the UK. Those in high-skilled 
occupations may be approved for longer 
expirations of three to five years. The draft also 
suggests that to limit the number of EU citizens 
entering the UK to undertake low-skilled 
work, there should be a salary threshold, some 
assessment of the skill level of the occupation, 
or an overall cap on the number of EU citizens 
allowed to immigrate into the UK. The second 
major change suggested in the document is 
requiring UK employers to look for employees 
from the native UK population whenever 
possible instead of the migrant population 
(similar to current policies in the US and 
Australia) to decrease the overall number of 
immigrants. This, the document suggests, 
would encourage employers to invest more 
in training programs to educate the native 
population rather than take on already-trained 
migrants. The government claims that this 
extra investment will be worthwhile, making 
the country more prosperous and successful as 
a cohesive, national unit. 
 While this leaked government report 
does not necessarily represent the immigration 
reform that will eventually evolve out of 
the Brexit negotiations, it does signal the 
government’s primary goals for future 
reform, since the government is already 
developing that future immigration policy. 
Using these proposed changes, the impact 
on the UK economy can be forecasted. This 
analysis focuses on the potential impact of two 
main points: decreasing low-skilled worker 
immigration and decreasing immigration as 
a whole. This assessment begins by reviewing 
various studies predicting the impact of post-
Brexit immigration reform on the UK economy.
Prospective Impacts  
of the New Policy
 The government’s main purpose in the 
leaked document is to develop an immigration 
scheme that benefits the UK. It claims that 
the old system was not sufficient because it 
allowed EU citizens “a right to reside in the 
UK regardless of the economic needs of the 
country.” The new plan aims to cut yearly 
migration from 250,000 EU citizens to only 
tens of thousands.
 The Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI) is a business organization in the UK that 
lobbies for the policy interests of firms and 
performs research on the potential impacts of 
reforms on businesses throughout the country. 
The head of skills and employment policy at 
CBI, Seamus Nevin, argues that the UK needs 
an immigration system that “provides control 
while also enabling employers to access the 
foreign workers they need at all levels—
whether it be short-term seasonal workers, 
intra-company transfers, or permanent 
solutions” (Horrocks-Burns). His concern 
regarding access to foreign workers is directly 
reflected in the rapidly increasing concerns of 
businesses. In polls between 2014 and 2015, 
the share of businesses deeply concerned 
about their future ability to access this foreign 
market, for both low-skilled and high-skilled 
workers, jumped up from 18% to 31%. After 
the referendum vote, this number rocketed 
again to 50%. Furthermore, by early 2018, 58% 
of companies believed that leaving the EU will 
hinder their access to the high-skilled workers 
they need to keep business running (Horrocks-
Burns). All of this is a clear illustration of UK 
businesses’ strong apprehension of the new 
immigration policy.
 Research from the Centre for Economics 
and Business Research (CEBR) finds that if 
immigration is reduced significantly across 
sectors, productivity will suffer due to loss 
of creativity and diversity in the workforce, 
particularly in knowledge-intensive sectors. 
The CEBR assumed numbers from the 
government pledge to reduce migration to tens 
of thousands. Their economic model studied 
two different scenarios: 1) a slow reduction 
plan where the target of 73,000 net migration 
is achieved by 2027 and 2) a fast reduction 
plan where the target is achieved by 2021. 
The models show that by 2025, in the slow 
plan GDP would be 1.5% lower than without 
the changes and 3.1% lower in the fast plan. 
Longer term, by 2040, GDP would be reduced 
by 8.9% and by 10.4% in the slow plan and fast 
plan, respectively. After taking into account the 
reduction in the population due to immigrant 
cuts, GDP per capita would also be lower 
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than without the changes. By 2025, GDP per 
capita would decline relative to no change by 
0.9% and 1.5%, in the slow plan and fast plan, 
respectively, and by 2040 by 4.1% and 4.9%, 
respectively (CEBR). Thus, extant research 
tends to agree that reductions to immigration 
will likely hinder economic growth.
 On the other side of the issue, UK-born 
citizens have slowly been changing their 
opinions on immigrants. UK-born citizens are 
beginning to think that immigrants may be 
beneficial to the economy. In 2011, 52% of UK-
born citizens thought immigrants were “bad” 
for the economy, but four years later, only 
35% viewed them as a negative force (Blinder). 
The Centre for Economic Performance at the 
London School of Economics has called the 
belief that the rising number of immigrants 
looking for work in the UK has harmed UK 
workers through increasing job competition 
the “lump of labour fallacy” (Wadsworth et al.). 
The Centre for Economic Performance claims 
the harm would only occur if the number of 
jobs available was fixed, not fluctuating to 
accommodate growing demand for services 
and goods with an increasing population. Far 
from stealing jobs away from UK-born citizens, 
the increased number of migrant workers 
coming to the UK enables higher wages and a 
more productive economy.
Expected Changes to Immigration 
Composition by Industry Post-Brexit
 The impact of proposed changes 
to immigration can best be analyzed by 
examining the average required skill levels 
of employees within individual sectors. One 
of the main policy objectives outlined in the 
leaked documents is to cut the number of low-
skilled immigrants entering the UK. Therefore, 
by conducting this analysis sector by sector, 
which sector will absorb the heaviest impact 
can be assessed. 
 According to the ONS,2 jobs such as 
“corporate managers and directors,” “science, 
research, engineering and technology 
professionals,” “health professionals,” “teaching 
 2The ONS utilizes Standard Occupational Classification 
2010 codes as the basis for defining the skill levels 
throughout their data.
Figure 3
Distribution of Workers in Each Nationality Grouped by Skill Level
Source: ONSa.
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and educational professionals,” and “business, 
media, and public service professionals” are 
high skill. Any occupation other than these falls 
either into the middle-skill or low-skill levels, 
with the lowest-skilled classified as “elementary 
trades and related occupations” and “elementary 
administration and service occupations.” While 
the immigrant population spans all skills levels, 
a large portion does not fall into the highest skill 
tier. If workers are disaggregated by country of 
origin (UK, EU14, EU8, EU2, and non-EU) and 
skill level, 37% of EU14 nationals working in 
the UK occupy high-skilled jobs (Figure 3). 
Comparatively, only 8% of EU8 nationals work 
in jobs that require high skills. On the opposite 
side of the spectrum, EU8 nationals and EU2 
nationals dominate the low-skilled and lower-
middle–skilled jobs, with 31% of both EU8 and 
EU2 nationals working in jobs categorized as 
these levels (ONSa). 
 Breaking down the immigrant population 
by economic sector, immigrants tend to work 
in lower-level retail and food service jobs as well 
as construction, manufacturing, and financial 
and business services. Of the EU immigrant 
population in the UK in 2016, 24% were 
employed in the wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels, and restaurants. An additional 18% of 
all EU immigrants were employed in financial 
and business services and 17% worked in public 
administration, education, and health. Turning 
to an alternate metric, the manufacturing 
industry has the highest proportion of workers 
from the EU, with 11% (Figure 4). Wholesale 
and retail trade is second, with 9% from the EU, 
followed by transport and communication with 
8.8%. Thus, the proposed new immigration 
policies are likely to hurt manufacturing and 
wholesale and retail trade the most in terms of 
constricting available labor.
 Combining the Annual Population 
Survey statistics for the EU14, EU8, EU2, and 
other EU immigrants, the most common skill 
level for EU immigrants entering the UK is 
“lower middle” at 31.95%, with “upper middle” 
at 23.43% and “low” close behind at 23.33%. 
 Dividing the population of EU immigrants 
in the UK by industry and skill level, 62.92% 
of EU immigrants in the agriculture, forestry, 
and fishing industry work in low-skilled jobs 
(Figure 5). Overall, the majority of the EU 
immigrants in the wholesale and retail trade 
Figure 4
EU Workers as Share of Overall Employment by Sector
Source: ONSa.
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industry consists of low-skilled (38.58%) 
or lower-middle–skilled (34.87%) workers. 
As Figure 4 shows, 9% of employees in this 
industry are EU immigrants, meaning that 
in total 6.61% of all workers in this industry 
are lower-skilled EU immigrants. This group, 
although small, almost certainly will face 
significant immigration declines within the 
next few years. Similarly, the transportation and 
communication, manufacturing, and public 
administration, education, and health sectors 
also rely heavily on lower-skilled EU workers: 
5.50% in transportation and communication, 
6.78% in manufacturing, and 1.54% in public 
administration, education, and health. 
Overall Economic Impact
 It is well known that the UK economy 
is service based. In fact, 79% of GDP derives 
from service industries, whereas 14% comes 
from production industries and 1% from 
agriculture (Booth). Many of the industries 
identified previously are likely to suffer major 
setbacks from restrictions on lower-skilled 
EU immigrants who would have worked 
in the service sector (transportation and 
communication, wholesale and retail trade, and 
public administration, education, and health). 
With service industries providing nearly four-
fifths of the GDP, this could be extremely 
detrimental to the health of the economy.
 A reduction in net migration to tens of 
thousands will inevitably upset the economy 
well beyond the impact of lower-skilled workers. 
The planned cuts to immigration are so large 
that it will not be possible to only target low-
skilled immigrants. There also will be a need 
to cut high-skilled immigration, although to a 
lesser extent. In short, then, the diverse array 
of available evidence uniformly suggests that 
economic growth is likely to suffer a significant 
blow following the anticipated immigration 
reform. 
Conclusion
 The UK’s decision to leave the EU came 
from a desire for self-preservation: UK citizens 
wanted more control over the UK, more 
control over who comes in and out of their 
country, and to improve their economy and 
Figure 5
Skill Levels of EU Immigrants by Sector
Source: ONSa.
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public services. These are all rational goals and 
make logical sense from the standpoint of a UK 
citizen who believes that the EU is holding the 
UK back from these opportunities. 
 But examining the facts and crunching 
the numbers paint a vastly different picture. 
Among the many different facets of the 
divorce bill that will come out of the Brexit 
proceedings, immigration reform may be 
one of the most vexing and conflicted. The 
new immigration policy formulated in the 
leaked document explicitly aims to take back 
control of the UK economy and untether it 
from the EU so it can thrive. Unfortunately, 
the strict constraints on EU immigration—and 
low-skilled immigration in particular—will 
suppress the low-skilled worker supply. Factory 
workers, waitresses, bus drivers, baristas, and 
more are critical components of the economy. 
Because nearly 80% of the economy relies on 
the service industry, which in turn depends on 
EU immigrant low-skilled workers, a sudden 
void of these base workers will inescapably 
hinder national productivity. Paradoxically, 
the surprising milestone of Brexit, driven by 
aspirations of a freer, more affluent country, 
will likely result in a laggard economy and a 
less prosperous country.
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